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Summary 
Like ocher landmark historic events, the war un the territory uf the fum1~r 
Yugosl~vi~ has bc~n explained by thre~ types of theori~s: mythologi_c.al,_ ~eientifie 
and cummun-St!nstc<ll, the latter making use of certrun pseudosctenrific argu 
menrs. The au thor claims that the theory blaming the media in all si.x republics 
uf the funm• t Yugu~>lavia for the outbreak of !he w~r helongs tn the latter 
r:ype. The empirical data gathered on the eve of rbe war show tha t ethnic toi-
CJ"llnce was higheM in the republ ic.~ which were later struck hy the war: Dosnia 
and Hercegovina and Croatia. The author pruvidl!l> an allcrnative tlxplanatiun uf 
the role of the media in paving the way for the W'dl'. Only in Serb1a did mass 
me.tl ia, in lhe circumstances ur the pre.vailllJg authori tal'ian otieutation o( the 
population before the war, serve to tile aggressive nationalist leadership for po-
litical mobilization, which a roused in the Serbiao people ~ feeling of imperil-
ment and a sense of omnipotence. After the outbreak of the war in Croatia 
a nd Rn~nia and Hercegovina, the media nave hccn only one of the elements in 
an eve.r-e.xpantling ~-pintl uf halretl antl violence. 
The speech on the collapse of Yugoslavia might begin with a proverb: 
"One death, a hundred prophets!" T his peace of common wisdom points 
to the deeply inbrra ined human need to "expla in away" everything that has 
happenecl, to give events a meaning, a purpose. T hus each smutnoe 
vremja is accompanied by a tJood of vario us " theories". AJJ of them can 
be divided into three categories: (1) mythologica l explan ations that attrib-
ute the events to "evil forces"; (2) social-scientific explanations Le. at-
tempts to expJaio the events by invoking the existing sdenLi fie<~l ly based 
theories or, in case the existing theorie,.; prove inadequa te, to make up 
new ones; (3) between these two extremes the re is a ple thora of 
"plausible" theories which can lay cla im to the SL:it: lltific s ta tus but a re 
really cornmllnsensica l solutions corroborated by ad hoc argumen ts. 
The purpose of this paper is not to de lve deeply into thcsc theories. 
We shall mention just in passing that the first category indudes various 
theories about the international conspiracies, very p opular in Serbia 
("masonic-Comintern-Vatic-an conspiracy against the en lire Serbian people") 
but are nothing less popular in Croatia (international anticroatian conspir-
acy) or in Bosnia-Herccgovina (intemational antiislamic conspiracy). The 
conspiracy theories are a modernized version of the be lief of "primitive" 
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tribes that the world is ruled by demons and eviJ magic. ~ucb beliefs are 
not contple lc ly alien to the s upe rmodern countries of the W~t: suffice is 
to remember that for the Western world the Soviet Union was the "evil 
empire", as dubbed by President Reagan. 
The illustra tion for the "ccond category is the recent revision of the 
classtc theory or modernization according Lu which the Balkan lu:U cuulc1 
not have been foreseen, so an <Jite rnative theory - tha t of interethnic 
competition for resoun:cs - was used. That theory had existed for some 
time, though in a somewhat different context ( Hodson, Seku lic, Massey, 
199-1). 
From the third, biggest category, only one theory wiiJ be singlctl out: 
tbc tme that directly atlrihute · outb reaks of vio lcm:e to mass media 
"controlled by nationalist leaders'' (Thomp. on 1994). Though supe rfici.<flly it 
is baseu on facrs, it has in fact been a spin-off of a "higher order" the· 
nry: the "equal guilt theory" which is in fact an "article of faith " but 
which poses a a paradigm of Kuhn's " normal" science (Popovic 1994). 
How to approach these theories? lt is easiest to di~mio;s the mythologi· 
ca l e..xplanarjon . The re i no need to check whe the r such explanations a re 
right or wrong, a· the re is no sense in disputing the belief!. uf Hopi lndi· 
ans 1 hat the rirual rain dance may actually bring rain. Though the be lid 
that the rain dance can influence the motion of cyclones may seem m e· 
teorologically preposte rous, it uncs no t mean that it is soci.o logically 
pointless. As .Robert K. Merto n pointed out, Lltat ritual is important for 
strengthening the cohe ion of the socia l &rroup in question and thii l this is 
its •·latent fu nction" (Merton 1957). Thus mythological and even mytho · 
maniac theories sboulu be looked at from Lhc point of view of their pri· 
marily latent function which they have fo r the conflicting parties. 
Rcganfmg scientific Lht:nrics, they should be lliscussed by social sd en· 
tists at professional meetings and in specialized publications. In science 
this is "busi11css as usua l". 
However, it is unclear how to approach the plansible (commonsensical) 
theories. Should lhey be subjected to the same treatment like the " true" 
scientific theories o r should only their functions be investigated'! 1 woulu 
suggest a two-phase procedure: in the flf'St phase they should be l>uhjected 
to a rigorous (empirica l) test. If they tltl no1 pass this te t (as most likely 
they wilJ not) then, in the second phase, they should be subjected to a 
functional analysis. Furthe r in the text 1 am going to apply the procedure 
to the theory about the media a. instigators of violence but will limit my· 
self to the first phase only, i.e. to the empirical test of th.is theory. 
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FormulafJ'ng and testing the theory 
In order to test this theory we must come up with a more precise 
definition. Strictly speaking this is not a formal theaty but an interpreta-
tive model of the "Balkan crisis". It may be defined as a system consist· 
ing of two propositions and two implicit assumptions. 
Proposition I: media production ami Llisscmination of negative images 
about other national and ethnic groups will certainJy provoke in the re-
cipients a high deb,rrt:e of into lerance and hatred towards those groups. 
Proposition 11: a high degree of into lerance and hatred will certainly 
result in collective violence among these groups. 
The first implicit assumption: a!J the media in the former Yugoslavia in 
equal measure fabricated and disseminated the messages of intolerance 
and hatred, and the national media of the newly imlependent states are 
doing it today. 
The second implicit assumption: Lhe rec1p1ents of the messages were 
exposed only to the influence of national (republic) media . 
Of course, both of these assumptions are grossly incorrect. Neverthe-
less, I suggest that we accepl them or t.empnrarily abstract from a re-
markable range of "virulence" of individual national media as well as 
from the countereffects that the meuia frorn one republic produced in 
other republics. Namely, to distinguish among the different levels of the 
intensity of propaganda and tbe countereffec.ts (even if we had e.mpiricaJ 
data for the quantifica tion of those variahlcs which we Llo not) would 
only unnecessarily complicate the analysis without affecting its resu lts. 
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In testing the mentiom:.tl propositions, 1 wiiJ use the indexes of na-
tional tolerance which D. Sekulic calculated on the basis of the erupiricaJ 
data from one survey conducted nn the territory of ex-Yugu~lavia at Lbe 
end of 19~9 and tht:: beginning of 1990. Results arc shown in 'I able l. 
Tf, in accordance with Propo. itinn T we assume tha t the rnetlia propa-
gttnda was the sole factor tha t created mllion»l int olerance, then the 
fmdings leatl us to the conclusion that mass media succeeded iu creating 
intole rance o nJy in the peripheral units of the Yugoslav federa tion. 1n the 
central republics (where rhe fiercest conflicts have occurred), the degree of 
tolerance wa · above the statistical average (in Bo nia and Hercegovina 
rather high - near 4.0). In other words, com rary to Proposit ion 1, ''the 
cri tical mass" of intolerance for the outbreak of an open cont1ict tlid not 
ex isL 
Another problem with this proposition wa~ how to explain the big 
varia tion)> among cen ain republics1pmvinces despite the arne intensity of 
the medi.a propaganda. Ohviou ly, some other factor was a t work here 
which modiCic:u the effects of the media prop:tganda. Indeed, the authors 
of tit~.; above study mentioned Lhat factor: it is the national (ethnic) and 
cultural diversity o r, populll rly called, mu lticulturality. T hey worked o ut the 
diversity inuexes (which range from 0 ro 1). Le t us have a luok a t the 
TC'-UJtl-. 
Table 2: Na rional and culluraJ diversity in the former Yugoslavia 




Mn nLcneJ!rO .45 
Setbia .27 
Slovt::nia . 19 
Macedonia .41 
Kosovo .39 
Snurce: l lodsou, Sckulic, Ma'lsey, op.cil. 
A c-omparison be tween the index of tole rance and the index of diver-
sity shows a po irive correla tion: the greater the div~.;r;ity, the bigger na-
tional tolerance. Or, in uther words, nationally more homogeneous com-
munities a re more: receptive to intolerant media messages than less homo-
geneous one..,. But this correlation does not hold for Kosovo and MaL-e-
dania: there some other factors weTc »I work about which the polling 
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data give no due. Tn short, Proposition I cannot be accepted uncondi-
tionally; it requires, to say the least, a substantia.! qualification. 
Things ;o~re much worse with Proposition fl. For example, had we 
known the tolerance indexes in the first half of 1990 (which, naturally, 
was not technicaJJy possible) we might have predicted the fo llowing: (1) 
armed conflicts and open violence are not likely to occur in Yugoslavia in 
the foreseeable future; (2) if, nevertheless, they do occur, it is most 
probably going to happen on Kosnvo, in Macedon ia and Slovenia, less 
probably in Croatia, and least probably in llosnia-Ilercegovina. The follow-
ing events gave lie to these predictions: war and violence on a massive 
scale broke out in Croatia and peaked in Bwmia-Hcrcegnvina. A., we can 
see, Proposition 11 was thus completely contravened: neither did intoler-
ance trigger off violem:e, nor did high tolerance prevent it. 
How to explain these paradoxical findings? ln this we are faced with 
two yucstions: (I) If intolerance and hatred did not provoke the conflict, 
what did? (2) Are mass media really blameless in this story? T am gning 
to try to allSwer these two closely re lated questions. 
The key to the riddle: authorit<iritw orientE1tion 
In the mentioned survey ( 19R9-1990), the subjects were offered the 
statement: "A people. without a leader is like a ma11 without the head". 
They were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with this 
statement ranging from "agree completely" to " disagree completely". Inter-
estingly enough, 61.5% of all subjects (total Yugoslav sample) agreed 
completely. lf we add lo this number those who simply li!:,'Teed with this 
state.ment, then this amounts to three quarters of the. polled subjects. lt 
must be noted here that Croats and Serbs deviate from the average val-
ues (Lazic 1991 ). How lo interpret this finding? Tl indicates a va luc orien-
tation which migbt be called authoritarian. Such a finding might have 
been expected: the political culture of the former Yugoslavia was authori-
tarian, despite the slucco nf self-management. 
ln authoritarian cultures there is a deep need for a leader. "A leader 
knows what he is doing", could be heard in Third Reich. "Comrade Tiro, 
we swear not to stray from your path", was sung in socialist Yugoslavia ; 
"Siobodan, just say a word, we are going to fly like buJJets", was sung 
(and is probably still sung) in Serbia. In shnrl, a leader should he 
obeyed . Even when that means banishing and killing people of other na-
tionalities, destroying homes and cuJtmal monuments. So, the outbreaks of 
armed conflicts and the related mass violence were not connected with 
the average dee,rree of national tolerance but how certain regions fitted 
into the expansionist designs of a leader. Slovenia remained outside the 
project of "Greater Serbia" and went unscathed by the conflict (with the 
exception of the tt!H-clay war which Misba Glenny called countedeit) . Un-
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ljke that, the conquest of Croatian territories (all lhe way to the Yi-
rovitica-Karlnvac-Karlobag line) was a part of the project and let.l Lu the 
a!Q;,'TC. ··ion and the violence. Tln.: entire Bosnia-Hercegovina was a part of 
the project and that i-; why the war there reached homble proportions. 
But the advocates of the ma.·s media theory llllght say: All right, we 
agree that the authoritarian politicaJ culture i!\ the key to the riddJe, but 
in the warring countries, the succe, sors of the former Yugoslavia, there is 
not one, but three leaders. AJI three of them are autht1ritariao nationalist 
leaders and hear equal blame. However, if lhe equal responsibility of the 
leader is not a ·'theoretical'' (meaning ideological) poMulate hut questio 
fact£ as it hould be in a serious analysis, then the folJowing should be 
proved: (I) th<tt the strategic goals of tht:Se three leaders on the eve of 
the war were symmetrical; (2) that the means used in the realization of 
these goals (poljtics) were roughly identical; (3) that the resources - pri-
marily military - which were at tht.:ir disposal, were mostly on a par. Up 
to now I have not set my eyes on a single political scie::nce study which 
would corroborate this. It is enough to compare the resources to get a 
dear picture without a deeper analysis. On the one hand Milo~evic had a 
control over the Federal Army (the fourth ''rongest army in Ettrope), 
federal guvenunent and federal hard currency reserves (politically. AOle 
Markovic was a "straw man~), foreign policy apparatus and the cap~taJ of 
the fom1er sta te. What did Tudjman have at. his disposal after the 1990 
electoral victory? The territorial army was disa rmed and be could not 
even rely unresetvetlly un the regular police. The creation of the police 
forces (within the legal system of lhc former SFR Y, the National Guard 
(the sn called ZNO) could be fuunded only as the poli<:e force) and the 
lightJy armed volunteers could hardly bavc. served for defense let a lone 
for an anack. Or, for that matter, what did Izetbegovic have in 1992? 
Thus, regarding the u1. tigtttion of aggression and violence (and iliU ts 
what we are dealing with here), the explanatory model baseL! on an 
authoritarian rwtional leader ca n he applied solely to the project of 
"Grc<tt c r Serbia" and irs agent Slobodan Milosevic. Orawing conclusions on 
the basis of sub. cquent comparisons of the actions and tile political re-
gimes of these three leaders - tlespite all po ible l>imilarities is a 
logical non equicur. 
The starling point of this model i-; rhat in an auLhuritarian culture 
people obey their leaders unquestioningly. Howt!vt!r, since people are not 
robots and do not reHct mechanically, their leader must secure their 
"consen t" (must convince them that his objectives arc "lofty", " historic" 
anti "l'acred") and a t the s•1me time he mu.'it Hrouse their feelin~. Jn 
short, he must mobilize them politically (Gellner 1983, Greenfeld 1992). 
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Mcdja Etnd poJj[jcaf mobiiJzEttion 
Jn an industrial society, it is difficult to achieve political mobiJjzation 
w11houl mHss (primarily electronic) mcdiH. In the NHzi pulitic.:<1l mobiliza-
tion the central role belonged to the radio, in the Serbian mobilization 
ln lht: television. Which Wl!rt: the functions of Lhc ml!uia in pulitic.:<~l mo-
bilizat ion? 
The first was to misinform the population. Many ordinary people in 
Serbia, who had never ho]jdayed on the Adriatic coast, were convinced by 
the media that there were no Croats there but only Serbs. Truth to tell, 
the lies ahout "Serhian Duhrovnik", "Serbian Zadar" and other "Serbian" 
regions were not made up by the media but by intellectuals (the SANU 
"academ ics", men o f letters, and alike), but the media disseminateu them. 
They also spread other fabricated historical, economic, political, and cul-
tural misrepresentations. Misinformation does not create hatred but is the 
first step in 1·hat direcl'ion. 
Second, the media systematically sowed distrust about other nationali-
ties. The conseyut:nees can hi.! seen in the polls conducted Hl the time, in 
which a significant number of people expressed the opinion that the co-
operation among differe·nt national and eth nic groups was possihle hut 
lhat total lmst was nul (Lazic 1991). That is the second step. 
When the media began to harp about the "imperilment of brother 
Serbs in Serbian Dubrovnik, Zadar, anu so on", antl those who were oth-
erwise toleranl became ready to rush to their "endangered brothers"' aid 
- then the process of political mobilization was completed. 
Let us look intn the Llmmarizarion of the scenario about the 
"imperilment' '. The feeling of imperilment was amplified and d1·amatized 
on million-strong mass rallies, broadcast by television. This <-Teated high 
emotional tension anu euphoria . However, the production of the sense of 
imperilment is only one side of the mass dramaturgy. The other side is 
the creation of the sense of power anu superhuman superiority which 
would cmsh the enemies who endanger the Serbian people. These two 
only superficially contrary feelings - of imperilment and superiority -
amalgamated tl1rougb a mythomaniac tradition and the nation's " historical 
mission" ("divine Serbia") made a deadly narcotic that ensu1·ed absolute 
and unconditional popular obedience to the Jeauer anu readiness to per-
form any crime the leauers may command in order to achieve their goals 
while lit the same time it exempts individuals of any moral responsibility 
regarding the treatment of the "enemy". In this, the leader does not 
count solely on nationalism and solidarity and the. infantile need of indi-
viduals to feel omnipotent in their identification with the leader, but on 
down-to-earth materialistic <~nu economic motives. Looting was among the 
strongest motives for political mobilization. Today, the paucity of chances 
for piJiagc (since in Bosnia there is nothing more to rob) seriously un-
dermines the fighting mora le of KantdZic's and Martie's army. 
What un: thc re<tsons behind this in-depth rcview of the process of 
pnlitic<tl mobilization for the "Greater'' Serbia? They are threefo ld: 
First, the politic<tl mobilization in Serbia precedcd the war on the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia. On~ hould only remember the spectacle 
on Gazimestan, where sabcr-mttling was deafening. The political mobiliza-
tion in Croatia ilnd Bosnia and Hercegovina came later, on the eve of 
the o pen conflict. J\l though based on the same principles, t ht! staging was 
much more rnodcsl. 
Second, the poli tical mobilizali(m in Serbia is a text-book case u f the 
populist mobilization ut the end of this tu rbulent century, which even 
Lenin, Mu'>Solini or Goebbels would not he ashamed of (Goebbels 1948). 
11 came up with a masterly !tulurion for an almost impossib le p!>ychologicaJ 
task: bow tu cunvince people on whose roofs !.hells do not drum and who 
tht! wailing of srrens does not force In take shelter in their basements, 
that they are endangered hut Rt the same time that tlu;y are superior 
(that the whole worlcl c;~nnot harm them). Psychu lngica lly, Tudjman and 
lzetbegovic had a much easie r task: thcy did not have to convim;e their 
people they were endaugcrcd; they could feel it on the ir skin. 
Third, the dramaturgy of the "happening of the people", .. anti-bun;<Ju-
t.Tatic revolution··. and later "the tree-trunk revolution" would be unimag-
LDable \Vithout dectmnic media. 
When the conflict reached its active stage, the attitudes of both the 
artackers and the attacked changed rapidly: tolenmce turned in to extreme 
intolerance and lethal hatred. What med ia propaganda did not ma nage to 
achieve in a decade, happem:d almost overnight when arms. spoke. Grosso 
modo, it could be said !ha l the violence was nnL provoked by hatred, but 
that the violence provoked hatred. At Litis stage the ef11cacy of the media 
improved. Hatred-mongering reached unprecedented height._, and its sway 
over the recipient<; w<L" greater than ever. People who are overcome hy 
hatred seck out such food for souJ tha t not only praises but ju\·tifies ha-
tred acts. Once the armed conflict had begun, it gained its own momen-
tum and escalated spi.raiJy. Media were hut <tO element of that spiral in-
fermi and here any monoca usal explica tion is totally in:.tdequa te. Of 
course, in this phasl.:!, nohody was innocent. Crwttian mass media played 
the centra l role in starting a chain ru<wtion of violence, triggen::d o ff by 
tht: "ethnic cleansing" of the Croatian population on the occupied te rrito-
ries. Tbe media (partk ularJy television) brought in1o every Croatian home 
personal trdhredies of the displaced peNons and their redefi nitkm of for-
mer neighbours as latent enemies who had shown their true face. Then, 
like in a forest fire , the entire primary ~cial structure of inte rethnic re-
lations m Croatia, which the media calllllaigns prior tn the fighting had 
failed to destroy, went up in tlames (Zupannv 1995, Dugandi:ija 1993). 
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Without tbe media the chain reaction would have hardly occurred. ln 
short, advocates of the media themy have t11rned a blind eye to Durk-
heim's methodological rule that social facts have to be explained by the 
facts which precede them. 
One djsheartenin.g conclusjon 
It is generally believed that the promotion of tolerance in plural socie-
ties prevents coUective violence. ln view of our experience, this the.sis 
should be qmt lifiecl: tolenmcc has a rcmarkahlc prophylactic value in 
nonauthoritarian political cultures. lf, however, political cu lture is authori-
tarian, tnh:~rance unt:S no harm but it does no good, e ither. After fighting 
bas started, falling back on tolerance in nonauthoritarian societies might 
stop the fighting, but in authotitmian systems such pleas will have no ef-
fect. Like in meuit:cinc, the rule in human societies is: if you start frnm a 
wrong diagnosis, the treatment wiJJ be to no avail Thus social scientists, 
who blame media and do not understand the role of autoritharian cu l-
tures, conclude that Lhe cause of the disease is the lack of true informa-
tion and that people wil l " have their eyes opened" and "get cured" if of-
fered the true information via foreign electronit; media whid1 arc nOl un-
der the control of the nationalist leaders. This was the guiding idea be-
hind the installation of a tloating radio-station with the motto dioit de 
parole i11 the Adriatic. However, its prol::,rrammcs had a few listeners in 
Croatia and Serbia (according to my private information there were a 
handful of listeners on the Dalmatian coast and in Bosuja-Hercegovina) so 
that tbis operation was disconLinucu un fin de compte. This does not 
mean that nothing can be done i11 the Balkan crisis to stop it, but cancer 
cannot be cured by aspirins. Anyway, it is well-known how a similar dis-
ease was curcu in Germany. 
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